This Element presents newly-collected cross-national data on reelection rates of lower house national legislators from almost 100 democracies around the world. Reelection rates are low/high in countries where clientelism and vote buying are high/low. Drawing on theory developed to study lobbying, the authors explain why politicians continue clientelist activities although they do not secure reelection. The Element also provides a thorough review of the last decade of literature on clientelism, which the authors define as discretionary resource distribution by political actors. The combination of novel empirical data and theoretically-grounded analysis provides a radically new perspective on clientelism. Finally, the Element suggests that clientelism evolves with economic development, assuming new forms in highly developed democracies but never entirely disappearing.
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भाषा अंग्रेज़ी ● स्वरूप PDF ● ISBN 9781009323222 ● प्रकाशक Cambridge University Press ● प्रकाशित 2023 ● डाउनलोड करने योग्य 3 बार ● मुद्रा EUR ● आईडी 8844425 ● कॉपी सुरक्षा Adobe DRM
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