James C. Clingermayer & Richard C. Feiock 
Institutional Constraints and Policy Choice 
An Exploration of Local Governance

Institutional arrangements constitute the ‘rules of the game’ for any civil and political society. To understand urban politics and policy making, including issues dealing with economic development, zoning, constituency representation, government borrowing, and service contract decisions, discovering institutional regularities is key. To achieve this the authors combine older institutional approaches emphasizing formal structure and governance organizations with newer approaches and transaction cost theory. Institutional Constraints and Policy Choice contends that institutional arrangements both shape and are shaped by human behavior, and when combined with contextual factors and the uncertainty associated with leadership turnover provide the basis of understanding how decisions are made at the level of local government.

Table of Content

Preface

Acknowledgments

CHAPTER 1
Institutional Foundations of Local Governance

CHAPTER 2
Institutional Incentives and Policy Choice

CHAPTER 3
Constituencies, Contacting, and Casework

CHAPTER 4
Leadership Turnover and the Delivery of City Services

CHAPTER 5
Turnover, Time Horizons, and Credible Commitments: The Politics of Long-Term Obligations

CHAPTER 6
External Constraints and Local Policy Choice

CHAPTER 7
Conclusion: Institutions and Local Government

Notes

References

Index

About the author

James C. Clingermayer is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Northern Kentucky University.
Richard C. Feiock is Professor of Public Administration and Policy at Florida State University.